My previous article provided an illustration of how Augustus used political restraint and compromise to establish his role as the center of gravity in Roman politics [1]. He could have simply used the military to force his will upon a defeated and recalcitrant Senate—as his adoptive father, Julius Caesar, had done. Yet, Caesar’s example had demonstrated both the illegitimacy and volatility of a system based entirely upon naked power—eventually someone will be bold or desperate enough to take you down, unraveling all your efforts in an instant. As Henry Kissinger points out, “legitimacy should not be confused with justice. It means no more than an […] agreement about the nature of workable agreements and about the permissible aims and methods” of each source of authority [2]. In other words, a legitimate distribution of political authority is based upon the reality of power relations, not an ideal. No individual or institution can ever be granted power without possessing the political leverage to demand it. As a consequence, the Augustan system can be a useful model for increasing the power of American states without tearing the union asunder.
First, principle alone will not be enough to justify decentralization—appealing to the intentions of the Founding Fathers is a waste of time (a topic I will cover in later article). State governments must assume from the start that business and political interests—both in Washington D.C. and within their own borders—will be hostile and subversive elements in any challenge to the status quo. These interests must be placated by offering local policies and arrangements that “out-bid” those currently offered by the federal government. Like Augustus, state and local governments must remove the incentives for the ruling elites and average citizens to align their interests with rival (i.e. federal) institutions. Think of it as creating a competitive policy market.
Second, having cultivated the personal loyalty of local citizens and business interests, states must then use this political leverage to prompt federal institutions to pass (and support) legislation that legitimizes increased state autonomy. Augustus achieved this by offering residual military and political power to the Senate. In the case of the US, states would probably have to offer Congress and the President greater control over foreign policy in exchange for relinquishing domestic authority. Given the fact that many a federal official with substantial foreign policy achievements have been brought down by domestic failures (i.e. Wilson, Nixon, etc.), this sort of trade-off might not be so unwelcome on the part of the central government. In this way, the devolution of domestic power to state institutions will be secured through existing mechanisms and institutional bargaining; making it difficult for the central government to renege on such an arrangement without a blatant—and illegal—use of force.
Third, under the Augustan system the Roman treasury was dispersed among various local and provincial governments. This, however, was most likely done on the basis of expediency—because travel and communications were slow, it would have made practical sense for the individuals on the spot to posses the financial means to address local problems. In these states united, the decentralization of the US treasury and the power to tax income would have to be justified on the grounds of the greater role of state governments in administering social and economic policies. Nonetheless, in the spirit of legitimacy and institutional bargaining, the federal government would need a constitutional assurance (most likely an amendment of some sort) that states would fund the federal government, even when sentiments are divided over policy—thus removing the ability of states to bully the central government into impotency as they did under the Articles of Confederation. Given the bargaining power states would have at this point (if the first and second points were adhered to) such an arrangement would be quite possible within the existing framework.
Fourth, just as Augustus backed up his authority with an effective military deterrent, so too must American states acquire an independent means of defending their sovereignty. Having earned the loyalty of their citizens through local social and economic policies, and procured an independent source of financial solvency—all with the blessing of the central government—the ability of states to reestablish a militia system would become increasingly practical. The American military industrial complex is perhaps the most burdensome aspect of the federal budget—as it was for Rome. An ability to dump these costs onto someone else’s shoulders would be very appealing to federal officials. The National Guard—which is already nominally under the control of state governments—would be the perfect mechanism for such an agreement. By agreeing to accept the financial costs of supporting portions of the US military within their jurisdictions, states could stipulate that such forces could not be deployed to active duty by the federal government unless the union was invaded by a foreign power. Likewise, the federal government would retain a residual national force commensurate with its foreign policy obligations.
The steps mentioned above should only be viewed as a very general—dare I say hypothetical—framework for restructuring the American union. This adaptation of Augustan methodology is simply an illustration of how all states have empowered themselves in the past (see articles 3, 4). It must be remembered that American local governments were designed to represent the interests of their citizens to the exclusion of all others [5]. While this is anathema to nationalistic approaches to governance, this institutional selfishness is the only way in which citizens within a system as vast and complex as the United States can have their voices heard.
Political activism which continues to focus primarily on the national level will only prolong the current arrangement of trading one nationally-enforced, ideological dictatorship for another. It is far more difficult for central institutions to thwart the restraints of powerful state governments—who are themselves close enough to their citizens to be restrained—than it is a fractious multitude with ever-changing and often contradictory demands; only demagogues and special interest groups benefit from the latter. The purpose of this theoretical sketch is to encourage debate on how neo-federalism can work. The details involved with this process must be determined by local political leaders and their communities.
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