In my previous post, I put forth the basic theoretical concepts of neo-federalism [1]. The notions therein should be viewed less as stated goals and more as existing tools to be harnessed in the service of neo-federalist policies. In this view, states’ rights are a matter of practicality, not principle. The problem we face is not that federalism has never been tried, but that it has failed (see articles 2, 3, 4). As a consequence, the task before us is to figure out how to reverse-engineer state sovereignty within the existing framework. To that end, the purpose of this article is to provide an illustration of the necessary ingredients for a legitimate restructuring of power.
The words Roman Empire often bring to mind a harsh, consolidated system of absolute power, administered from a single city—a single individual. While this may have been the case during the mid to late Empire, Rome’s first emperor sat at the helm of a far more decentralized system. Like the men of 1776 AD, the individuals who came to power with Augustus in 30 BC had to reestablish legitimate authority in the aftermath of an illegal use of force. Because military power can only go so far, stamping out sources of future rebellion required compromises with the existing legal and political order.
Augustus achieved this in four fundamental ways. First, he relinquished all overt claims to absolute power, collecting his imperial authority through the periodic holding of various elected offices and powers delegated to him by the Senate. In other words, he legitimated his influence on the system by channeling it through established political mechanisms. Laws would be passed through the Senate and approved by popular assemblies just as they had always been. In this way, it would be difficult for his political opponents to legitimize rebellion on the grounds of restoring the old republic or removing a tyrant—as Brutus and his fellow conspirators had done with Julius Caesar.
Second, the various Italian governments and imperial provinces maintained their own independent treasuries, as did Rome. Local governance was left to the individuals on the spot, save the registration of public lands, supporting imperial road networks, and funding local military and administrative costs. This kind of autonomy was not, however, the result of political principles of limited government. Rather, direct control of local matters was impractical due to the slow speed of communications and transport technologies.
Third, Augustus ensured that the ruling senatorial class was personally invested in the new regime. According to Anthony Everitt in his book Augustus (2006), the civil wars had weakened or destroyed many of the old guard. As a result, “new men” from the Italian countryside filled the gaps, many of whom
came from regions that had received citizenship as little as fifty years before. Theirs was an Italian rather than a Roman identity. Even more controversially, leading men from southern Gaul and Spain […] were recruited as senators. All these arrivistes saw their fate as inextricably linked to the new regime. So did a good number of impoverished aristocrats, for the astute Augustus took good care to fund them generously and thereby constrain their freedom to oppose him. [5]Strangely enough, Alexander Hamilton and his political heirs utilized very similar techniques in the US to bind the wealthy and poorer classes to the federal government [6].
Fourth, and perhaps most important, the Senate granted Augustus control over the legions in Spain, Syria, and Gaul—the “rebellious” nature of the local populations were used to justify this move (he was, after all, the most successful politico-military leader of the time). In return, Augustus relinquished his control over the remaining legions and provinces of the empire. The significance of this arrangement was that it left the bulk of the Roman army under the authority of the Princeps, placing them near Italy in case the Senate ever decided to renege on their deal.
So what does all of this ancient history have to do with neo-federalism? Is this guy advocating a power grab by a single, absolute ruler? Of course not; some might even argue that such a system already exists in the US. The political shrewdness and practicality of Rome’s first emperor led to the creation of a fairly decentralized (federal?) governmental structure. The methods employed by Augustus demonstrate the importance of consolidating one's powerbase before attempting to challenge the status quo. Having accomplished that, structural change must then be legitimized through existing institutions. Consequently, it could be argued that American states could utilize a similar methodology to bargain with—perhaps even coerce—the federal government to relinquish control over domestic policy in the United States. My next article will expand upon this theory, suggesting a very general approach to adapting the tactics of Augustus to the systemic realities of the American union.
Thursday, June 18, 2009
Augustan Rome: ancient federalism?
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The question I have for you is are you leaning in favor of federalism( just with the balance tipped far more in favor of states rights than the current system) or a purely confederate system
ReplyDeleteI am leaning towards a revised form of federalism as laid on in my most recent article (Neo-Federalism: reverse engineering a union).Confederations are often too unstable (one of the many reasons the C.S.A. lost the war).
ReplyDeleteThe challenge is to devise new ways of approaching checks and balances. That is the overall objective of the neo-federalist project.
I agree a confederation can only work on a small scale and even the its cumbersome. The original system of checks and balances I believe is still effective we just need to change either how they are interpreted or restore the boundries originally set
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