Friday, May 15, 2009

Reasons of State




Previously, I discussed the origin of the state system in Renaissance Italy[1]. Lacking the legitimacy of tradition or religious sanction, Italian governments were forced to replace social obligation with compulsion. This in turn evolved into a rather violent system of territorial consolidation and expansionism. As the Renaissance wore on, this ad hoc institution was gradually imported by the kingdoms of England, Spain, and France. The question is: what was the pay-off to forcing previously autonomous authority structures into a centralized system of government?

First of all, it is important to understand the relationship between social organization and the means of production. Authority structures tend to evolve around the manner in which food and wealth are produced. During the Middle Ages and the Renaissance, the means of production consisted of rural agriculture and urban merchant trade. Not surprisingly, ownership of land represented the main source of wealth and authority. Control over large tracts of real estate meant one could raise revenue from cash crops, rents, and taxes from urban centers located within a landlord’s sphere of influence.

The problem for medieval monarchs was that control over the means of production was diffuse. Although a king or emperor might have a legitimate claim to rule over his respective realm, his ability to project authority was very limited. First, most authority was local, vested in numerous vassals with their own political and financial interests. Second, the primitive state of roads and other transportation technologies meant that news and armies traveled slowly. This, combined with the ability of local authorities to tax their subjects and maintain military forces of their own, meant that medieval kings had to tread lightly in local matters. Third, the king’s authority rested upon the concept of divine right, bestowed upon him by God’s representative on earth: the pope. Any public break with the Vatican could result in excommunication, a form of religious ostracism that effectively legalized open revolt by a king’s vassals.

In theory, these competing institutions were held together by the common rules and values of their Christian faith. However, as with all social/political arrangements, some individuals tended to end up with more power than others. Those with less inevitably dreamed of getting more (Heroine has nothing on power). Vassals often battled kings and kings had to deflect external encroachments on their regional authority (i.e. popes and other monarchs). Yet, all of this was usually carried out within the moral/legal framework of Latin Christendom.

The only way to truly break this vicious cycle was to step beyond the traditional rules of engagement and that meant using force. The state system offered a way to increase the exterior power of a monarch by consolidating internal legal and production mechanisms. In other words, those who made a king's external policies difficult would have to go. But Unlike their Italian counterparts, European kings could use their traditional authority to justify most of this self-serving ruthlessness.

For instance, trumped up charges of heresy could turn murder or the confiscation of a wealthy vassal's property into the heroic acts of a pious king, defending the sacred institutions of Christendom; a shrewd marital alliance could direct traditionally local revenues into the royal coffers. Increased control over food and wealth production meant a king could pay for his army independently; thus, guaranteeing their personal loyalty. All of these factors served to turn medieval kingdoms into super-statos, whose ability to project military force made them increasingly unresponsive to the constraints of the medieval power structure.

Seen from this perspective, a centralized government enables statesman to exploit a society's military potential. Our modern conception of sovereignty is based on the ability of states to unshackle themselves from external constraints through the threat of violence. This in turn enables the relationship between the government and the governed to be based on practical local realities, as opposed to abstract external narratives. Of course the downside is that interstate relations can often be violent and unpredicatable. Most modern debates on foreign and domestic policies revolve around the trade-offs invoved with mass and local societies; sovereign states vs. regional unions.

1 comment:

  1. I think the most important insight here is that the State is, indeed, violence. That is, if not for the State, you would see numerous, smaller societies waging war - at various levels of intensity - against each other. The State, empowered with a monopoly on violence, is able to united these disparate societies into a nation; the size of which would be impossible without the presence of the State. Alternatively, when States fail, one of the first symptoms of which is violence, we see the decoupling of the nation into separate, sovereign entities.

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