The Federalist Dilemma part 2: theoretical miscalculations

The creation of thirteen separate states prevented nationalism from playing a major role in the fight for American independence [1]. The legitimacy of state governments over that of Congress was further strengthened by the fact that post-war domestic upheavals had been managed on the local level [2]. Nevertheless, the central government proved fairly adept at prosecuting the war with Britain, resolving interstate border disputes, and hashing-out criteria for the admission of new states into the union. In this sense, a fairly successful division of labor had developed between domestic and central institutions under the Articles of Confederation.

Yet, one of the major problems with this arrangement was that the American union had essentially been a war-time alliance. And as it has been with most political associations of this sort, the removal of a common threat dampened enthusiasm for common commitments and policies. In other words, the true implications of separate American identities became apparent with the defeat of British forces. The states began treating Congress as an obstacle to their interests, even going so far as refusing to send it money or delegates. Issues of individual state tariffs, unstable paper currencies, and the undermining of international treaties made it difficult for American diplomats to claim to speak on behalf of a united confederation.

From the Federalist perspective, the weakness of the central government was threatening to recreate the destructive interstate relations of Renaissance Italy and 18th century Europe [4, 5]. The early instability of the new system had reaffirmed their belief that humans were inherently selfish and violent. Because humans constituted the machinery of states, their institutional representatives are equally self-centered and dissembling. What was needed was a strong central authority that could bind the separate state interests into a uniform national identity

This was a radical departure from union and should be treated with more suspicion than it is today. As I pointed out in a previous article, national institutions are often used to coerce or persuade diverse populations to accept particular policies; usually to the benefit of specific interest groups [8]. Central governing bodies are able to override local institutions, forcing the collective wealth and military potential of the entire population in a single direction. In other words, national governments are often the tools of empire.

Federalists attempted to ease suspicions over the potential power of the new central government by dividing its authority between three separate institutions. Unfortunately, these mechanisms of checks and balances were borrowed from the British model; a system that required the existence of distinct social classes. For instance, a hereditary monarch was head of state; the upper house of Parliament (House of Lords) represented the nobility; the lower house (House of Commons) represented the moneyed interests. Because these groups were “formally and permanently separate,” each institution had built-in incentives to check the power of the others [6].

In America, however, no such social distinctions existed. There were no monarchs or titled nobility. Land and business opportunities were freely available to anyone with the skills to make use of them. To be sure, there were certainly differences between rich and poor, but with no social barriers preventing an individual from acquiring or losing wealth (unless of course you were a slave), anyone could move between the two classes. As a consequence, although federalist theory attempted to emulate the British government (President=King, Senate=Lords, House of Representatives=Commons), the social homogeneity of American society could not make central institutions inherently competitive.

It was hoped that this theoretical problem could be overcome by “[building] into the mechanism of government itself enough variations on election, powers, term of office, and complication of function to create separate interests and perspectives” [7]. This was reinforced by a Supreme Court, which eventually gained the power to nullify the actions of state and federal behavior. Yet, the major flaw in this approach was that it overlooked the actual competing interests in American society: the planters, the merchants, and the states that represented both. In doing so, the increased power of the central government would be used to subjugate excluded social groups and state institutions to the interests of the ruling faction of the moment.

The planters wanted the central government to stay the hell out of the way (no trade barriers, government subsidies, or permanent military establishments). The merchants, however, wanted to utilize the central government to create business-friendly environments both within the Union and abroad (i.e. protective tariffs, infrastructure subsidies, and a strong military to protect trading interests abroad). The states tended to side with whichever of these groups represented the predominant source of economic activity within their borders--a fact that has divided the Union into regional blocs (North vs. South) ever since.

Thus, over the past two and a half centuries, these theoretical oversights have created bitter political battles for federal power (including one civil war). Starting from the emergence of the Federalists and Democratic Republicans, the sole purpose of national parties has been to impede or prevent the operation of federal checks and balances. This is achieved by ensuring that the individuals occupying federal offices are beholden to interests outside of their respective establishments (so-called "party lines"). This in turn prevents federal institutions from developing different perspectives and interests.

Why, for instance, should the Senate check the decisions of the House if a national party has a majority influence in both? Likewise, Supreme Court Justices are appointed by the President and approved by the Senate based on the ideological principles of the party in power. This is not to say that there are never challenges to particular decisions, but it is usually on the grounds of party politics and not, as Federalists had hoped, the result of institutional rivalry. So long as national parties can prevent the operation of checks and balances on the federal level, there is little point in dealing with state and local governments. As a consequence, without serious revision, American federalism will continue to act as a one-size-fits-all policy machine that ignores the local realities of American communities.